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BRIDGETTE BALDWIN* 
INTRODUCTION 
The rhetoric of Ivan Illich has been discussed, analyzed, and 
critiqued in countless scholarly articles.2  There have been confer­
ences centered on his work, classes taught on his writings, and fo­
rums populated with his criticisms even after his death in 2002.3  In 
his work, Illich offered a critique on the modernization of our social 
institutions and unabashedly offered unpopular and controversial 
solutions to what he deemed to be the problems in a move toward a 
capitalist world.  Most notably, no area of society is saved from his 
* Dr. Bridgette Baldwin is a Professor of Law at Western New England 
University School of Law.  I would like to express a debt of gratitude to the organizers 
of the Illich Symposium hosted by Western New England University for inviting me to 
present these ideas, and also to the Western New England Law Review.  I would also 
like to thank Francis Fox Piven, Dean Martha Davis, Robin Chandler, and Davarian 
Baldwin for helpful insights, comments, and criticism on early drafts of this paper. 
1. A significant portion of this Article is excerpted from the author’s Ph.D. 
dissertation. See Bridgette Baldwin, Wisconsin Works? Race, Gender and 
Accountability in the Workfare Era (Jan. 1, 2010) (Ph.D. dissertation, Northeastern 
University), available at http://iris.lib.neu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1019&context 
=law_pol_soc_diss.  Specifically, portions of this article are excerpted from the 
following pages of the author’s dissertation: 141-44, 156-57, 175-78, 218-19, 233, 235-38, 
240-41, 244-45, 248-52, 254-63, and 269-70. 
2. See generally  DAVID CAYLEY, THE RIVERS NORTH OF THE FUTURE: THE TES­
TAMENT OF  IVAN  ILLICH (2005); THE  CHALLENGES OF  IVAN  ILLICH: A COLLECTIVE 
REFLECTION (Lee Hoinacki & Carl Mitcham, eds., 2002); DAVID HORROBIN, MEDICAL 
HUBRIS: REPLY TO IVAN ILLICH (1978); Richard Kahn & Douglas Keller, Paulo Freire 
and Ivan Illich: Technology, Politics and the Reconstruction of Education, 5.4 POL’Y 
FUTURES  EDUC. 431 (2007); Peter L. Berger, Rembering Ivan Illich, FIRST  THINGS 
(Mar. 2003), www.firstthings.com/issue/2003/03/march. 
3. See generally IVAN  ILLICH  LEARNING  WEB, http://ivan-illich.org/ (last visited 
May 24, 2012); IVAN  ILLICH  LISTSERV, mail.ivan-illich.org/mailman/listinfo/illich_sig_ 
ivan-illich.org (last visited May 24, 2012); Ivan Illich Writing on the Web, PRESERVA­
TION INST., www.preservenet.com/theory/Illich.html (last visited May 24, 2012). The In­
ternational Journal of Illich Studies released its first issue in 2009 and is a journal that 
focuses on the writings and contemporary wisdom of Ivan Illich. See INT’L J. ILLICH 
STUD., available at http://ivan-illich.org/journal/index.php/IJIS/index. 
445 
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446 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:445 
critique.4  This Article attempts to fuse Illich’s misplaced ideas of 
gender roles with how privatization of welfare services in Wisconsin 
under the Wisconsin Works program (W-2) has legitimized shadow 
economy and work through mandated community service jobs. The 
way in which W-2 mothers and their conditions are an index for a 
shift in capitalist social relations in this age of neo-liberalism. The 
conditions of W-2 mothers dovetail nicely with, but also, powerfully 
exceed, the diagnosis of social relations that Illich encapsulates as 
shadow work.  In the most general sense, neo-liberalism’s focus on 
privatization5 has ushered in the shrinkage of a robust welfare state 
and all the institutions that go along with it.  However, W-2 mothers 
reveal the shadows of this new private economy where we find ac­
tually not a diminished state, but instead the transference of power 
facilitated by the state to private interests.  In this particular case, 
welfare reform has converted what was once compensated, al­
though low, or more readily identifiable forms of labor into the cat­
egories of apprenticeship training and/or community service. The 
effects of this transference has in fact generated a new market of 
relative prosperity whereby the community service acts of welfare 
mothers en route to jobs that will most likely keep them below the 
poverty line has helped subsidize a wide ranging market of subcon­
tracted not-for-profit and for-profit W-2 agencies that benefit from 
the shadow work of these women.  And it is through welfare 
mothers that we can see the powerful converges between gender, 
labor, and privatization in the new economy. 
What, then, is shadow work according to Ivan Illich?  In his 
1981 collection of essays entitled Shadow Work,6 Illich describes 
4. See generally IVAN ILLICH, DESCHOOLING SOCIETY (Ruth Nanda Anshen ed., 
Haroer & Row 1971); IVAN D. ILLICH, ENERGY AND EQUITY (Calder & Boyars 1974); 
IVAN ILLICH, GENDER, (1982); IVAN ILLICH, SHADOW WORK (1981); IVAN ILLICH, LIM­
ITS TO  MEDICINE: MEDICAL  NEMESIS: THE  EXPROPRIATION OF  HEALTH (Marion Bo­
yars 2002) (1975). 
5. Privatization of welfare is an initiative to introduce market relationships into 
the bureaucratic production of public services where a standard of social justice is re­
placed by an ethos of economic costs and benefits. With W-2, the state facilitated a 
system of privatization where counties became subcontractors in order to secure a mar­
ket share of the welfare administration.  This process of privatization created a system 
where welfare mothers were unclear about competing regulation and violations of pol­
icy, social workers were replaced by Financial and Employment Planners (FEPs), and 
all actors involved were subjected to a new set of market-based criteria that encouraged 
antagonism over service provision within the daily realities of public aid. See DAVID 
HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2007); LISA DUGGAN, THE TWILIGHT 
OF  EQUALITY?: NEOLIBERALISM, CULTURAL  POLITICS AND THE  ATTACK ON  DEMOC­
RACY (2004). 
6. ILLICH, SHADOW WORK, supra note 4. 
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unpaid work that complements wage labor as shadow work.  He 
states: 
It comprises most housework women do in their homes and 
apartments, the activities connected with shopping, most of the 
homework of students cramming for exams, the toil expended 
commuting to and from the job.  It includes the stress of forced 
consumption, the tedious and regimented surrender to therapists, 
compliance with bureaucrats, the preparation for work to which 
one is compelled, and many of the activities usually labeled “fam­
ily life.”7 
Therefore, according to Illich, shadow work is the unpaid work that 
society performs in preparation for consumption.  It is the extra 
work required by industrial capitalism beyond subsistence.  But this 
type of labor is more than mere preparation; he asserts that it is a 
series of coerced acts and practices that we are compelled to per­
form within the late capitalist system, i.e. capitalism after factories.8 
Prior to 1996, mothers and their children had the limited and 
continually contested safety net of the Aid to Families with Depen­
dent Children program (AFDC).9  But with Wisconsin leading the 
charge for welfare reform, many single mothers were left struggling 
to negotiate the varied requirements of the new program, W-2, 
while at the same time laboring over how to provide the basic needs 
for their children.  This Article, through the voices of welfare 
mothers, will present an alternate lens through which to see how 
community service jobs (CSJs) and the privatization of social ser­
vices shift economic resources from the state to market interests. 
Therefore, within the logic of the marketplace and the self-service 
economy, services which had once been considered waged labor are 
now reassigned value as acts of community service.  Additionally, 
this Article will unpack how privatization has not simply created 
shadow work but has generated an entire shadow market, where 
the state transfers wealth and resources to private companies with­
out the traditional economic parameters of competition. 
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Before AFDC was enacted through the Social Security Act of 
1935 and the birth of the New Deal, most, if not all, social services 
7. Id. at 100. 
8. Id. 
9. SHELDON H. DANZIGER, ECONOMIC  CONDITIONS AND  WELFARE  REFORM  2 
(1999). 
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448 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:445 
were handled by private religious and charitable organizations.10 
However, with the onset of the Great Depression and because of 
the economic crisis affecting private religious and charitable organi­
zations, the state and local governments began to provide public 
funding for social services.  In the 1960s, we witnessed an overhaul 
of government funding for social services and this increase in partic­
ipation by the government continued until the mid-1990s with the 
introduction and implementation of the Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)11 and block 
grants.  However, most particularly, in recent years the federal gov­
ernment has withdrawn federal entitlements to fund state welfare 
programs.12  In its place, the private sector has reinvented itself and 
reemerged as the leader in providing welfare services to indigent 
clients.13  The federal government has divested its interest in pro­
viding for the poor and has offered significant contracts to for-profit 
and non-profit agencies for a variety of social services.14 
Under AFDC, the state paid more attention to the conditions 
for eligibility (i.e., the man-in-the-house rule and residency require­
ments, etc.).15  With the advent of welfare reform, the focus shifted 
away from examining who was eligible for social services to deter­
10. M. BRYNA  SANGER, THE  WELFARE  MARKETPLACE: PRIVATIZATION AND 
WELFARE REFORM 13 (2003). See generally STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH & MICHAEL LIP­
SKY, Nonprofits for Hire: The Welfare State in the Age of Contracting (1993). 
11. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 
U.S.C., 8 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
12. When welfare changed from AFDC to PRWORA in 1996, much of the fed­
eral funding was consolidated into a Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
block grant.  Once a grant amount has been determined, this amount is fixed for 
upwards of six years.  Within this time period, the amount will not change.  By example, 
the amount that is calculated for the block grant during the FFY 1996-2002 was calcu­
lated based on the highest amount received by a state from either, “(1) the average of 
AFDC-related funding to the state for FFY 1992 through 1994, (2) AFDC-related 
amounts paid to the state in FFY 1994, or (3) 4/3 of AFDC-related amounts paid to the 
state in the first three quarters of FFY 1995.” JACOB  ALEX  KLERMAN ET AL., WEL­
FARE REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: STATE AND COUNTY IMPLEMENTATION OF CALWORKS 
IN THE  SECOND  YEAR 359 (2001), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/ 
pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1177.pdf.  States are required to contribute at least 
75% to 80% of what it spent the prior year on its welfare program. This contribution is 
based on whether the state met the federal work requirement.  Additionally, if a state 
fails to comply with federal standards, the TANF grant will be reduced by up to 5%. Id. 
at 360-61. 
13. SMITH & LIPSKY, supra note 10, at 11. 
14. Id. at 17. 
15. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618, 634 (1969), overruled by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 687 (1974); King v. 
Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 334-35 (1968). 
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2012] PRIVATIZATION OF WELFARE AND ALTERNATIVE MARKETS 449 
mining how to make as many people as possible ineligible by em­
phasizing the need to work.16  Diversion programs were created, or 
in states like Wisconsin, accelerated, to de-emphasize welfare cash 
assistance and situate applicants within employment opportuni­
ties.17  In fact, under the new law, states were required to report a 
ninety-percent rate of employment for families receiving assistance 
under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block 
grants in 2002.18  This mandate by the federal government en­
couraged a convergence between public and private institutions in 
solving the “welfare problem.”  Moreover, the public outcry against 
the reported years of public assistance program mismanagement 
under AFDC suggested that perhaps charitable and private organi­
zations could better meet the employment demands of the rising 
welfare roll.19 
Scholars contend that local and state governments have stead­
ily contracted out services because of dissatisfaction with the wel­
fare system under AFDC, the implementation of welfare reform 
and the passage of PRWORA, and cynicism over whether the state 
and local governments could adequately perform effectively under 
the new program.20  Before the enactment of PRWORA, critical 
scholars argued that the current welfare system under AFDC cre­
ated dependent recipients without any motivation to be indepen­
dent and economically self-sufficient.21  Therefore, changing 
“welfare as we know it” not only meant changing the structure of 
welfare, but also re-organizing who would run the program. With 
this view, allowing private for-profit or non-profit organizations to 
take a turn at running the program would introduce a new effi­
ciency and productivity not just to the women receiving welfare, but 
16. David Ellwood, Welfare Reform as I Knew It: When Bad Things Happen to 
Good Policies, PROSPECT.ORG (Nov. 19, 2001), http://prospect.org/article/welfare-re­
form-i-knew-it-when-bad-things-happen-good-policies. 
17. John A. Wagner, Welfare Spending in Milwaukee County: “Where Does the 
Money Go?”, 5.2 WIS. POL’Y  RES. INST. REP. 13 (Mar. 1992) available at http://www. 
wpri.org/Reports/Volume%205/Vol5No2.pdf. 
18. CHILDREN’S WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, CWLA 2005 Children’s Legis­
lative Agenda, CWLA.ORG, http://www.cwla.org/advocacy/2005legagenda16.htm (last 
visited May 24, 2012).  PRWORA replaced AFDC with TANF on July 1, 1997. U.S. 
Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of 
TANF Recipients, HHS.GOV (July-Sept. 1997), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/ 
character/fy97/revsum.htm. 
19. SANGER, supra note 10, at 17. 
20. Id. at 23-24; see also MARY JO BANE & DAVID T. ELLWOOD, WELFARE RE­
ALITIES: FROM RHETORIC TO REFORM (1994). 
21. BANE & ELLWOOD, supra note 20, at 67. 
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450 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:445 
to the program itself by simply getting women off the rolls.22  Fur­
ther, the federal government no longer matched state spending on 
welfare, and states were now given a set amount of money under 
the TANF block grant system.23  Therefore, it was in the best inter­
est of the state to create a more efficient and cost-effective system 
under the new law.  In fact, the passage of PRWORA spawned a 
new interest in privatizing social services.24  The privatization of so­
cial services, if administered properly, could benefit fiscally 
strapped states by shifting some of their public burden onto private 
companies in ways that provide a new infusion of federal funds 
without federal oversight or state responsibility for a growing pov­
erty class. 
Wisconsin was able to privatize its W-2 program through waiv­
ers even before PRWORA became law.25  When welfare services 
were under the auspices of AFDC, the state and local governments 
of Wisconsin controlled access to the services and determined the 
rules of eligibility.  With the creation of the W-2 program, however, 
the state of Wisconsin offered the program up for sale to the high­
est and most efficient bidder.26  To this end, the W-2 program of­
fered contracts to private agencies to determine eligibility 
determinations and control case management services, employment 
placement, and all other welfare-related services.27  The state of 
Wisconsin solicited Request for Proposals (RFP), particularly in 
Milwaukee County, from private for-profit or non-profit agencies.28 
In Milwaukee County, the local government was also allowed to 
submit an RFP to compete with private agencies.  However, the 
22. Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion 
and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1127 (2000). 
23. KLERMAN ET AL., supra note 12, at 359. 
24. PAMELA  WINSTON ET AL., PRIVATIZATION OF  WELFARE  SERVICES: A RE­
VIEW OF  LITERATURE 3 (May 2002), available at http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/ 
pdfs/privatization.pdf. 
25. Carol Harvey et al., Evaluating Welfare Reform Waivers Under Section 1115, 
14.4 J. ECON. PERSP., 165, 167 (Fall 2000), available at http://test.aeaweb.org/jep/ 
archive/1404/14040165.pdf. 
26. REBECCA SWARTZ ET AL., W-2 CONVERTING TO WISCONSIN WORKS: WHERE 
DID FAMILIES GO WHEN AFDC ENDED IN MILWAUKEE? 9 (1999), available at http:// 
www.mathematica-mpr.com/PDFs/w2report.pdf. 
27. DAVID DODENHOFF, PRIVATIZATION WORKS: A STUDY OF THE PRIVATE AD­
MINISTRATION OF THE  WISCONSIN  WORKS  WELFARE  REFORM  PROGRAM 4 (2002), 
available at http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/privatization_works.pdf. 
28. Id. at 5. 
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2012] PRIVATIZATION OF WELFARE AND ALTERNATIVE MARKETS 451 
county declined.29  Hence, the W-2 Program in Milwaukee became, 
in all senses of the word, private.30 
The figure below briefly outlines the administrative effects of 
privatizing welfare services. 
FIGURE 1: SERVICES PRIVATIZED UNDER PRWORA (AND W-2)31 
Case Management: 
intake and diversion 
activities, Eligibility, 
case monitoring and 
tracking, and sanctions 
for noncompliance. 
Employment Services: 
job search and 
placement assistance, 
work experience, 
education, and training. 
Support Services: 
Child care, 
transportation, 
mental health, 
substance abuse 
treatment and 
domestic violence 
counseling. 
Wisconsin and Milwaukee County, in particular, allow both 
for-profit and not-for-profit organizations to administer W-2 pro­
grams.32  In Milwaukee County, there have been at least five orga­
29. The state of Wisconsin gave each county the opportunity to have the first 
right of refusal to administer the W-2 program if they met certain requirements, includ­
ing caseload reductions.  Counties that met those requirements were allowed to admin­
ister the program without participating in the bidding process. Those, including 
Milwaukee County, which did not meet the requirements, would have to submit a com­
petitive bid. See id. at 4-5. 
30. STATE OF WIS. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU, ADMINISTRATION OF THE WIS­
CONSIN  WORKS  PROGRAM BY  OPPORTUNITIES  INDUSTRIALIZATION  CENTER OF 
GREATER MILWAUKEE, INC. (2004), available at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lab/reports/ 
04-OIC_ltr.pdf. 
31. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING  OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-41, SOCIAL 
SERVICE  PRIVATIZATION: ETHICS AND  ACCOUNTABILITY  CHALLENGES IN  STATE 
CONTRACTING (Apr. 1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/he99041.pdf; 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING  OFFICE, GAO/GGD-98-87, PRIVATIZATION: QUESTIONS 
STATE AND  LOCAL  DECISIONMAKERS  USED  WHEN  CONSIDERING  PRIVATIZATION 
OPTIONS. (Apr. 1998), available at http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/gg98087.pdf. 
32. STATE OF WIS. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU, supra note 30, at 1, 8. 
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452 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:445 
nizations awarded contracts to run W-2 agencies: Goodwill 
Industries, Opportunities Industrialization Center of Greater Mil­
waukee (OIC-GM), United Migrant Opportunity Services 
(UMOS), YW-Works, and Maximus.33  In 2004, OIC-GM was the 
largest provider of W-2 services in the state of Wisconsin.34  Over 
fifty percent of clients enrolled in W-2 were assigned to the region 
in which OIC-GM was responsible.35  OIC-GM is a community 
based non-profit organization, providing services to the low-income 
community in Milwaukee County.36  OIC-GM was awarded its first 
contract as a W-2 provider in 1997.37  In 2005 at the time of this 
study UMOS was the largest provider for W-2 clients in the state of 
Wisconsin.  UMOS is a private non-profit organization which offers 
employment and job training services to the largely Latino migrant 
community in Milwaukee.  In 1997, UMOS received a three-year 
contract from the State of Wisconsin to operate the W-2 program.38 
YW-Works is a community-based for-profit organization created by 
the YWCA, Kaiser Group, and CNR Health, Inc. in 1997.39  That 
same year, YW-Works was awarded a contract to administer the W­
2 program.  In 2003, YW-Works serviced roughly 1,700 W-2 cli­
ents.40  Lastly, Maximus is a nation-wide for-profit organization 
that was awarded a contract to administer the W-2 program in Mil­
waukee County in 1997.41  All of these organizations were given the 
autonomy to administer the program in the way that they deemed 
appropriate. 
II. COMMUNITY SERVICE, JOB SEARCH, AND SHADOW WORK 
The goal of W-2 is to assist individuals in finding employment. 
Unlike its predecessor, if an applicant is eligible for W-2 services, 
the applicant will be placed into one of four “self-sufficiency” place­
ment areas.42  The goal of W-2 is to move each participant up the 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 1. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Brief History of UMOS, UMOS, http://www.umos.org/corporate/history.html 
(last visited May 24, 2012). 
39. DODENHOFF, supra note 27, at 5. 
40. There were over 9000 W-2 clients in Milwaukee County. MICHAEL D. TAN­
NER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE: HELPING OTHERS IN CIVIL SOCIETY (2002). 
41. DODENHOFF, supra note 27, at 5. 
42. W-2, WISCONSIN WORKS, 6-7 (1996), available at http://content.wisconsinhis-
tory.org/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/tp&CISOPTR=49223&CISOSHOW= 
49207 (last visited May 24, 2012). 
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self-sufficiency ladder until they are no longer receiving subsidized 
employment.43  The first and most desirable placement is unsub­
sidized employment.44  All W-2 applicants will be considered for 
this placement area.45  At this level, a participant is considered “job 
ready” and will receive services geared toward attaining employ­
ment.46  This level places an emphasis on work first and furthers 
employment over other worthy endeavors such as extended educa­
tion or training opportunities.47 
The next placement area is Trial Jobs or subsidized employ­
ment.48  In this placement, a participant is given a temporary job 
earning at least the minimum wage in order to gain work experi­
ence and training.49  Participants are paid by the employer.50  This 
particular placement is beneficial to the employer because the em­
ployer receives a bonus fee per month from the state for every W-2 
participant in the Trial Job placement.51  Another job placement 
area is called W-2 Transitions (W-2T).52  Participants with signifi­
cant barriers to both private and community service employment 
are placed in this subsidized placement.53  Most participants in this 
placement level are not considered “job ready” and may have disa­
bilities relating to physical, mental, or cognitive limitations, drug 
dependency issues, or learning disabilities.54  Additionally, partici­
pants in this category may have the primary responsibility to care 
for a dependent that is disabled.55 
One other placement level mandates that its recipients engage 
in shadow work.56  In CSJs, W-2 participants volunteer at various 
non-profit organizations around the city in order to gain work expe­
rience and training.57  While participants are placed in CSJs and 
43. Id. at 7; WIS. DEP’T OF  CHILDREN & FAMILIES, WISCONSIN  WORKS (W-2) 
MANUAL, ch. 1.1.2 (Apr. 7, 2011), available at http://dcf.wisconsin.gov/w2/manual/ 
whnjs.htm. [hereinafter W-2 Manual]. 
44. W-2 Manual, supra note 43, at ch. 7:1.0. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at ch. 7.3.0. 
47. W-2, WISCONSIN WORKS, supra note 42, at 6. 
48. Id. 
49. W-2 Manual, supra note 43, at ch. 7.3.8. 
50. Id. at ch. 10.1. 
51. See id. at ch. 7.3.3, 10.1. 
52. Id. at ch. 7.4.2. 
53. See id. at ch. 7.4.2.2. 
54. See id. at ch. 7.4.2.1. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at ch. 7.4.1. 
57. Id. at ch. 7.4.1.3. 
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each job requires varying degrees of skill development and task 
output, all participants receive cash assistance in the amount of 
$673.58  CSJs may consist of a number of volunteer opportunities 
including government, charitable, private non-charitable organiza­
tions and private for-profit organizations.59  Additionally, a partici­
pant placed in this level may also be given certain other activities 
designed to increase training or education.60  Such additional activi­
ties may include classes towards obtaining a GED, basic adult 
higher education courses, training for employment, and English as a 
Second Language (ESL) classes.61  Participants who are unable to 
get a job without additional education may also attend technical 
community colleges for up to two years as acceptable CSJ activi­
ties.62  However, it is important to note that the W-2 program 
stresses minimal educational attainment until the participant has 
succeeded in reaching self-sufficiency in the workforce arena, and, 
therefore, attending school in lieu of volunteer activities is at the 
discretion of the FEP.63  Additionally, the participant would still be 
required to perform twenty-five hours per week of CSJ activities 
and attend ten hours per week of class activities.64 
The goal of the CSJ placement is to give the participant enough 
training to eventually place them in some sort of unsubsidized em­
ployment in the private employment sector.65  Most individuals 
placed at this level have never been employed, and, therefore, lack 
the work habits and skills necessary to compete in the private 
workforce arena.  Hence, CSJs are designed to mirror private em­
ployment opportunities but without private employment compensa­
tion.  CSJs are designed to teach life skills to the previously 
unemployed, as participants are taught “valuable work habits and 
work socialization skills which all employers require from their 
workers.”66  Participants are also taught reliability and work ethic, 
as well as how to be a team player.67  Each CSJ maintains slots 
58. W-2, WISCONSIN WORKS, supra note 42, at 6; W-2 Manual, supra note 43, at 
ch. 7.4.1.9. 
59. W-2 Manual, supra note 43, at ch. 7.4.1.3. 
60. Id. at ch. 7.4.1.2. 
61. Id. at ch. 7.4.1.7. 
62. Id. at ch. 7.4.1.7.1. 
63. Id. at ch. 8.1, 6.1. 
64. Id. at ch. 8.3.2.5. 
65. W-2, WISCONSIN WORKS, supra note 42, at 6. 
66. Id. at 10. 
67. Id. 
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specifically designated for W-2 participants and does not, therefore, 
replace existing employees with W-2 workers.68 
Community service requirements are a form of uncompensated 
labor, but yet are vital to sustaining the profitability of the W-2 
economy, and constitute an important yet under-examined site of 
shadow work.  This section looks at how a system of welfare priva­
tization has affected the lives of African-American women by shift­
ing economic resources from the state to market interest through 
reassignment of previously compensated labor as CSJs. 
W-2 policy and procedures presumes that W-2 recipients 
should be placed in apprenticeships so that they can learn how to 
work.  The ritualistic understanding is that the reason these women 
are poor is because they do not have work habits or work skills. 
Therefore, they are placed in “work” opportunities and much is re­
quired of them in order to develop work habits and work skills. 
The trivial nature of the “work” opportunity is irrelevant; this op­
portunity is supposed to benefit the recipient by helping her de­
velop good work habits.  Ann, one of the participants in this study 
and a W-2 recipient, challenges such assumptions about her work 
ethic. 
Ok so I have not had a job in a number of years because under 
AFDC you did not have to work.  I mean you could work, but 
your check was not going to be as high if you did.  But under this 
new W-2 they have you working your butt off, doing this and 
doing that.  They assume that since I have not worked it means 
that I can’t work, that I don’t know how to handle a job.  So they 
set me up doing things at the Goodwill and I ain’t knocking no­
body that work at the Goodwill, but working there making what 
W-2 gives me ain’t gonna keep me afloat for too long.  I need 
some training in something that I like, not simply having me 
work, for work you know just for working.  And they want you to 
do so much for so little.  In the beginning before you see any of 
they money, you out there day after day bringing in slips to them 
for no reason.  This is what they call the trial period—trial period 
for what?  To see how long you can make me do this dog and 
pony show?  It ain’t helping me get a job it’s just busy work plain 
and simple.  They expect more from us as poor mothers because 
we are poor, no one gonna stand up for us, no one cares about 
people on welfare.  Not W-2, not FEP workers and not the jobs 
they send us to.  They just want to humiliate us to the point 
68. Id. 
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where we don’t want to use the system or better yet, work us to 
death, right.  Well I guess I need to work, right.69 
Here, W-2 creates a subsidized labor force based on the pre­
sumption that work, even meaningless and menial tasks, establishes 
job-readiness for “welfare queens.”  The illusion is that these wo­
men on W-2 are unemployed because they lack skill training; there­
fore, the menial tasks and shadow work ultimately make them 
ready for legitimate wage labor.  But the reality is that the jobs 
available to these women do not provide opportunities for advance­
ment, and, instead, either keep them complacent and dependent, 
or, at best, completely regulated within a shadow market. The pa­
ternalistic essentialist70 viewpoint sheds light on this phenomenon. 
This approach endorses a situation where these women are man­
aged into scripted scenarios of not only what training is appropriate 
but also under what circumstances any sort of training will be pro­
vided.  The agenda here is clear: so long as these women are placed 
in any work condition, they will be trained to survive, and, thus, 
move into self-sufficient roles.  However, the reality is that without 
technical skills or educational training, these women could continue 
to be constrained to the bottom rung of the economic ladder. 
W-2’s Work First initiative encourages the placement of most 
participants into volunteer jobs.71  These volunteer jobs rarely lead 
to permanent employment because they are meant to be temporary 
placement activities in order to give recipients without a work his­
tory some work experience.  Most CSJs last for six months and can 
be extended for an additional three months.72  If the CSJ chooses 
not to hire the W-2 recipient, the recipient is placed into another 
69. Interview with Ann, a W-2 recipient (2005). 
70. In the context of welfare discourse, the term “paternalistic essentialism” sug­
gests that there exists a predetermined construct of a welfare mother profile, which 
presumes the specific characteristics or behaviors unique to the welfare poor. Those 
who marshal a paternalistic essentialist position then assume that every member of the 
welfare poor is of one particular social type that the state will govern irrespective of 
multi-faceted personal choices and challenges.  The profile of this essential welfare be­
ing goes on to shroud the complexities of welfare experiences under an imagined carica­
ture no matter who the person is or what that person’s particular circumstance may be. 
This portrait of the poor, thus, serves as justification for state or market actors to make 
decisions on behalf of the poor with little concern for their personal wishes, interests, or 
even needs. 
71. Interview by author with FEP Worker (2005). See generally WISCONSIN POL­
ICY INSTITUTE REPORT, WISCONSIN WORKS: ONLY WORK SHOULD PAY (2004), availa­
ble at http://www.wpri.org/Reports/Volume16/Vol16no7.pdf. 
72. See W-2, WISCONSIN WORKS, supra note 42, at 6, 10. 
32073-w
ne_34-2 S
heet N
o. 63 S
ide A
      08/21/2012   07:54:18
32073-wne_34-2 Sheet No. 63 Side A      08/21/2012   07:54:18
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-2\WNE206.txt unknown Seq: 13 20-AUG-12 15:20
2012] PRIVATIZATION OF WELFARE AND ALTERNATIVE MARKETS 457 
CSJ position.73  Changing CSJ positions will continue until the re­
cipient has reached the maximum allowable time limit in the CSJ 
employment position.74  Many of the mothers are shifted from one 
site to another without any real stability in employment or actual 
opportunities in skill building or training. 
It is also important to note that it is irrelevant, as far as W-2 is 
concerned, that the actual W-2 placement may not have matched 
the skill of the individual or even the desire of the participant.  One 
such individual, Naomi, observes, “All they care about is placing 
me in busy work.  They don’t care what type of CSJ I’m in.  I’ve 
sorted hangers, put glue packs together and worked at that filthy 
food pantry.  And what do I have to show for it, nothing but a kick 
in the butt.”75 In the end, the only thing that matters for W-2 com­
pliance is that the recipient is engaged in some type of volunteer 
work, of any kind, and the assumption is that this quasi-labor will 
engender a good work ethic assumed to be missing from recipients. 
However, recipients counter that in order to make W-2 work, job 
opportunities must be offered that lead to permanent employment. 
While any type of employment may be the philosophy of the W-2 
mission statement, desires for a higher quality of life call for em­
ployment opportunities which will do much more than move unem­
ployed recipients into the category of the working poor. 
Employment opportunities must be tailored to meet the goals and 
abilities of the individual recipient. 
Within a capitalist social order, we understand that there are 
gradations of class status predicated on one’s labor power and the 
ability to sell this labor power within the opportunities available in 
a given market.  Therefore, those at the bottom rung sit there be­
cause their labor power is not regarded as highly valuable within 
the existing marketplace.  However, paternalistic essentialism in­
serts an added wrinkle to the meaning and structure of class differ­
ence.  Not only are those on welfare in poverty because they have 
not accumulated wealth and skills, but also they are seen as perpet­
ual children, lacking the capacity to develop the skills that can gen­
erate the potential for class mobility.  Paternalist essentialism 
makes poverty sit beyond the realm of politics, i.e., something that 
can be struggled over, as a product of social inequality or something 
that can be changed.  For those surviving under welfare, poverty is 
73. Id. at 7. 
74. Id. at 8, 10. 
75. Interview by author with Naomi, a W-2 recipient (2005). 
32073-w
ne_34-2 S
heet N
o. 63 S
ide B
      08/21/2012   07:54:18
32073-wne_34-2 Sheet No. 63 Side B      08/21/2012   07:54:18
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-2\WNE206.txt unknown Seq: 14 20-AUG-12 15:20
R
 
 
458 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:445 
not deemed a social fact, but is marked as a behavioral dysfunction, 
a choice to opt-out of the normal functioning of civil society. 
Therefore, when no volunteer opportunities are available, recipi­
ents are placed in job search activities. Another individual, Tracy, 
who has experienced the system first-hand, confirms this reality: 
My first experience with the job search was so embarrassing. 
You know we have to go out every day for a certain amount of 
hours to look for a job . . . . I actually went to the Job Center and 
got on the computer and started looking for places that I can 
work at.  Some places you can, you know, give them the applica­
tion through the computer but other places you have to go there. 
So whenever I had to go to a place, I had to give this paper to 
sign.  It was so embarrassing because you know they not going to 
look at you seriously if you give them W-2 paper and the second 
thing is that now they know you on W-2.  I felt like I was back in 
school and having to bring home a note to my momma to sign.  I 
did that for one or two days and then I started pulling them just 
on the newspaper and signing myself.  No one checked but even 
having to do it one time was so stupid.  And you know they make 
us do that because they don’t think we have enough sense to get 
a job.76 
This experience of looking for jobs as a training exercise shows that 
W-2 training has little to do with any actually existing market; 
rather, it is structured based on a set of ideas about mothers as dys­
functional laborers.  Additionally, this job search is a form of un­
paid labor.  W-2 recipients are required to engage in this type of 
labor before determination of eligibility.77  Therefore, in the most 
classical sense, this type of “unpaid servitude” epitomizes Illich’s 
characterization of shadow work.78  Many mothers clearly exper­
ienced the futility of this exercise, but also likely understood that 
the true goal of this job seeking exercise was to train mothers in the 
basic skill of compliance. 
As the reform-based policy was emerging, it constructed a set 
of parameters, guidelines, and sanctions based on an ideal-type: the 
welfare queen that had been demonized in public discourse.  Before 
actual mothers can traverse the arduous path from poverty to self-
reliance, they are forced to fight through the long shadow cast by 
the welfare queen type.  This is more than a metaphorical illusion, 
as the welfare queen became the benchmark for policymaking. 
76. Interview by author with Tracy, a W-2 recipient (2005). 
77. Interview by author with FEP Worker (2005). 
78. See generally ILLICH, SHADOW WORK, supra note 4. 
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Sanctions are instituted based on the presumption of the mother’s 
inherent deceptiveness.  Work requirements are designed based on 
her inherent laziness, and skill-building exercises are crafted to 
counteract a presumed inability for job readiness.79  Even low-skill 
busy work is valorized as noble based on the presumption that a 
mother’s unemployment is the product of not only bad choices, but 
also poor job skills, instead of a paltry market.80  Therefore, an ac­
tual mother’s protest against such policies confirms her challenges 
to work and does not challenge the welfare system as is it currently 
constructed. 
III. PRIVATIZATION OF SHADOW WORK81 
When market relationships were introduced into the bureau­
cratic production of public services, the program moved from a 
standard of social justice to a logic of costs and benefits.  In Milwau­
kee County alone, there have been at least five agencies holding 
contracts to administer the W-2 Program.82  Some organizations 
have been not-for-profit while others are for-profit.  In the case of 
the for-profit business, the organization expects to increase its reve­
nue.  This profit-driven orientation motivates agencies such as YW-
Works or Maximus to accept contracts to administer W-2 services. 
Private companies want to stay in business; therefore, they engage 
79. See MARC V. LEVINE, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MILWAUKEE CENTER FOR 
ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT, THE  CRISIS  DEEPENS: BLACK  MALE  JOBLESSNESS IN  MIL­
WAUKEE 2009 (2010), available at http://www4.uwm.edu/ced/publications/blackjobless­
ness_2010.pdf; UNIVERSITY OF  WISCONSIN-MILWAUKEE  EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING 
INSTITUTE, SOCIO-ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF NEIGHBORHOOD ISSUES FACING MILWAU­
KEE PUBLIC SCHOOLS STUDENTS AND THEIR FAMILIES (2009), available at http://www4. 
uwm.edu/eti/2009/MilwaukeeSocioEconomicAnalysis.pdf; DEVAH  PAGER, MARKED: 
RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION (2009). 
80. From 2003-05, Black Americans represented 6% of the population in Wiscon­
sin yet 48% of the black families lived in poverty, 10.9% of black adults were unem­
ployed, and 17.1% of black adults were under-employed.  Additionally, black women 
earned $4.11 less than white men. CENTER ON WISCONSIN STRATEGY, BLACK WISCON­
SINITES AND  ECONOMIC  OPPORTUNITY 2 (2007), available at http://www.cows.org/pdf/ 
ds-blackwisconsites_011107.pdf (last visited May 24, 2012). 
81. Here I focus on the most common understanding of privatization, in which a 
government offers contracts to private organizations for services traditionally 
performed by local or state agencies.  In some circumstances, this can include local and 
state participation, but in most cases, the government has completely turned the reigns 
of what were previously welfare services over to private agencies.  At the heart of 
privatization is the idea that market-based competition among for-profit agencies will 
increase the quality of services. 
82. SWARTZ, ET AL., supra note 26, at 1 (“As the result of a competitive con­
tracting process, five private agencies provide W–2 assistance in the state’s largest met­
ropolitan area, Milwaukee County.”). 
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FIGURE 2: MILWAUKEE W-2 REGIONS MAP83 
Milwaukee W-2 Regions Map 
Effective 
January 1, 2006 
CMA & JDPA Sites 
Northwest - 6550 N. 76th St. 
Northeast - 1915 N. Martin Luther King Dr. 
CMA - Case Management Agency 
JDPA - Job Development
 Placement Agency 
Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, Bureau of Workforce Information 
Date prepared: 1/30/2007 
File: S:\DWS\Bwi\ArcGIS\Heather\MILW_2006regions_offices_new names_sites_06-09D.mxd 
Northwest 
Central 
Southwest 
Northeast 
Southeast 
Mill Road 
Milwaukee/Vliet Streets 
Locust Street 
Brown Street 
Menomonee River 
Villard Street 
76th S
treet 
6th/P
ort W
ashington R
oad 
27th S
treet 
CMA - MAXIMUS, Inc. 
JDPA - Policy Studies, Inc. (PSI) 
CMA - YWCA 
JDPA - Policy Studies Inc. (PSI) 
CMA - UMOS 
JDPA - UMOS 
CMA - MAXIMUS, Inc. 
JDPA - MAXIMUS, Inc. 
CMA - UMOS 
JDPA - UMOS 
Southeast - 2701 S. Chase Ave. 
Southwest - 1304 S. 70th St. 
Central - 4030 N. 29th St. 
83. WISCONSIN  DEPARTMENT OF  WORKFORCE  DEVELOPMENT, BUREAU OF 
WORKFORCE INFORMATION, MILWAUKEE W-2 REGIONS MAP (Jan. 30, 2007), available 
at http://dcf.wisconsin.gov/w2/pdf/milwaukee_w2_regions_map_2006_2009.pdf. 
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in behavior that will generate the most profit. They attempt to es­
tablish reputations in the community to attract consumers by train­
ing their employees in both the skills needed to operate the 
company and perform customer service.  They stand by their prod­
ucts or services with eye-appealing advertisements and quality con­
trol guarantees.  In most cases, it is assumed and understood that a 
market-based approach assures competition, which in turn gener­
ates a climate for efficiency and productivity.  However, in the cur­
rent formation of the workfare era and the creation of W-2, this is 
not the case.  Within Milwaukee County’s existing W-2 structure, 
there are not a number of for-profit welfare service providers com­
peting against one another for client loyalty.84 
Of the five agencies holding contracts for W-2, only two, YW-
Works and Maximus, are for-profit organizations. However, be­
cause of the zoning of participants, YW-works will never have to 
compete with Maximus for clients.  In fact, what we witness with W­
2 is the classic monopoly system.  The current formation of the W-2 
program assigns one single institution to an area of town known as 
a zone within the welfare system.85  Therefore, if you are a W-2 
client within a particular zone you only have one option for service, 
good or bad.  The end result, despite appeals to a competitive and 
efficient W-2 program under capitalism, generates a monopoly en­
vironment that heightens callousness and evades accountability. 
The way in which an agency secures its hold on the market is 
by facilitating a relationship between the community service labor 
of W-2 mothers, (i.e., their shadow work) and the sub-contracted 
needs of the state (i.e. the workfare agency).  In this tripartite rela­
tionship, the value of the sub-contracted institution is predicated on 
its ability to manage the shadow labor of welfare mothers.  In ex­
change for that relationship, the institutions are provided with con­
tinual contracts from the state.86  But what is even more explosive 
about this revelation is that not only does each agency have a mo­
nopoly of clientele among the W-2 recipients, but they are also ben­
efitting from a shadow market. 
84. SWARTZ, ET AL., supra note 26, at 1. 
85. See supra Figure 2. 
86. DAVID DODENHOFF, PRIVATIZATION WORKS: A STUDY OF PRIVATE ADMIN­
ISTRATION OF WISCONSIN WORKS WELFARE REFORM PROGRAM 4-6 (2002), available at 
http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/privatization_works.pdf (explaining that Wis­
consin established “caseload reduction, job placement, and AFDC expenditure targets 
for the counties” that, if met annually, would lead to a renewed contract). 
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In the private business arena, the presumption is that busi­
nesses will produce the most efficient products or services in ways 
that simultaneously maximize their profit margins. The observa­
tions here are not meant to suggest that governmental control 
would necessarily produce greater efficiency.  But under the model 
of public aid, cost-efficiency and profit should not be the 
benchmarks.  Moreover, a public aid approach would leave open 
the possibility to hold decisions up to the scrutiny of a citizenry, the 
voting power of both state residents and recipients, as opposed to 
simply the limited interest of a board of trustees or the laws of a 
workfare market that is itself maintained by taxpayer dollars. 
The end result in Wisconsin’s privatized regimen is that the 
lack of competition produces an inferior product without market­
place consequences, but with overwhelming marketplace benefits. 
Under a profit-driven model, there is no longer the social program­
ming image or focus, where help is given based on need.  Instead 
the market-based approach requires W-2 agencies to market them­
selves as being profitable or efficient in getting clients off the 
rolls—even if the goal originally was to help those in need. To be 
sure, welfare is big business, but not for the proverbial welfare 
queen with multiple children that we caricature as getting rich off 
the rolls.  Here, the gross accumulation of wealth is reserved for the 
subcontracting agencies.  For example, Maximus has been awarded 
contracts as the administrator of W-2 with a value in excess of 
$107.7 million.87 
Not only do we see welfare converted to a large money making 
industry but the method by which money is generated may also 
cause one to pause.  Helping those in need does not generate profit, 
but under W-2 there is in fact a range of economic incentives.  Indi­
vidual service workers receive bonuses and contracted employers 
receive cash benefits based on shrinking the rolls. The general ar­
gument is that workfare is designed to transition welfare mothers 
from the status of welfare dependency to labor self-sufficiency. 
However, the underside of this story, in the shadows of W-2 policy, 
lurks a hidden, yet effective, strategy for extracting labor and profit 
from these mothers without reciprocation. The consequence of 
mandated community service along the W-2 ladder prevents clients 
from gaining skills from upper mobility and education possibilities, 
and it relegates these women to reserve labor force status.  Ulti­
87. Administration of the Wisconsin Works Program by Maximus, Inc., WISCON­
SIN.GOV, http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lab/reports/maximus.pdf (last visited May 24, 2012). 
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mately, women can remain stuck on the community service rung of 
the ladder throughout their tenure with W-2, while the agencies 
benefit and profit from the numerical existence of W-2 mothers on 
the roll.  This subtle approach encourages welfare to be solely an 
initiative to eliminate the rolls without any concern for skill build­
ing.  The following figure may not entirely speak for itself, but says 
volumes about the gross shift in the approach to welfare based on 
the rapid decline in the rolls after the rise of the for-profit 
paradigm. 
88FIGURE 3: TOTAL AFDC/W-2 CASES WITH A CASH BENEFIT.
88. KIM  SWISSDORF, KATE  MAGUIRE & MARLIA  MOORE, WISCONSIN 
LEGISLATIVE  FISCAL  BUREAU, INFORMATIONAL  PAPER 46: WISCONSIN  WORKS (W-2) 
AND  OTHER  ECONOMIC  SUPPORT  PROGRAMS 43 (2007), available at http://legis. 
wisconsin.gov/lfb/publications/Informational-Papers/Documents/2007/46.pdf. 
32073-w
ne_34-2 S
heet N
o. 66 S
ide B
      08/21/2012   07:54:18
32073-wne_34-2 Sheet No. 66 Side B      08/21/2012   07:54:18
C M
Y K
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\34-2\WNE206.txt unknown Seq: 20 20-AUG-12 15:20
464 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:445 
The above figure reveals that in the state of Wisconsin, there 
were close to 100,000 participants in AFDC in 1985.89  When Max­
imus was awarded a contract to administer W-2 in 1997, there were 
approximately 35,000 participants in W-2.90  In just a year, a little 
less than forty percent (approximately 20,000) of the participants 
were no longer participating in W-2.91  While the general goal of W­
2 at its inception was to get people off the welfare rolls, the for-
profit approach enhances that agenda because increasing the reve­
nue of private companies on the backs of the poor is not perceived 
as being wrong.  Instead, agencies highlight that somehow the busi­
ness of welfare is to eliminate welfare recipients, shrinking the rolls 
is profitable, and the “end of welfare as we know it” is a public 
good.  In this context, profitability has shifted the welfare agenda 
from the realm of serving citizens to the realm of marketing to con­
sumers (both the state and potential work sites). 
This process of de-centralization could potentially provide an 
unprecedented amount of intimacy and interaction between recipi­
ents’ needs and the service providers.  The structure of W-2 in Mil­
waukee County can easily be understood within a pro-capitalist 
model of governance.  Here, there is great potential to establish a 
direct correlation between the performance efficiency of the service 
provider—the agency and legion of FEP workers—and a corollary 
generation of revenue.  Yet the monopoly framework of the zone 
paradigm does not operate within the principles of a free market, 
where capitalism dictates that efficiency and productivity are gener­
ated by choice and competition.  There is an almost feudal system 
here, where the service provider has sole domain over a zone, elimi­
nating the possibility for client choice and hence dismantling the 
infrastructure for competition that would ideally maximize service 
efficiency. 
Undoubtedly, there may be arguments that if clients are al­
lowed to utilize any agency they choose, some agencies would have 
an overload of clients due to superior service, while others may not 
have enough.  However, if there were truly a free market system, 
then those agencies that lose clients would be required to be more 
efficient and competitive.  The way in which Milwaukee County’s 
W-2 program is organized, efficiency and competition are, in fact, 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
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discouraged.  Allowing W-2 providers to purchase a monopoly92 in 
a particular region not only discourages provider competition and 
client choice, but it also allows W-2 regulations to be arbitrarily ap­
plied and arbitrarily interpreted, thus producing a lack of clarity 
and uniformity in program administration. 
Additionally, Milwaukee County has the highest W-2 caseload 
in the state of Wisconsin.93  With only five zones of services, there is 
no doubt that caseloads are invariably high.  While verification of a 
particular caseload limit was unavailable, FEP indicated that at 
times a FEP worker could have over 200 active clients and another 
200 to 300 clients that were simply receiving case management ser­
vices.  The implication of a high caseload translates into a mechani­
zation of services, including high caseloads, little time, no quality 
consistency, and perhaps a lowest common denomination approach 
to service.  One of the end results is that the clients are not just 
subject to the whims of a hostile labor market, but they are also 
subject to the travails of a callous workfare system.  Here, 
overburdened FEP workers provide an arbitrary dissemination of 
information, which results in limited access to a wider range of aid 
and assistance, further reinforcing the working poor status of the 
women on W-2.  The perfect storm of misinformation, roll reduc­
tion incentives, zone monopolization, and discouragement of skill 
building converts service provisions into big business, a shadow 
market with little oversight and high profit margins. 
Despite the renewed focus on independence in the workfare 
era and a renewed interest in self-help, women in this study main­
tain that W-2 has thrown them into a world of privatized service 
provisions where self-sufficiency translates into entering the ranks 
of the working poor, where the only opportunities for work resides 
in shadow labor.  At its inception, W-2 was interested in moving 
mothers out of the public welfare state and into the private sphere 
of work, any work, so long as the mother was earning a wage. 
While it must be recognized that in many cases mothers who move 
off of welfare and into the workforce do achieve a modest increase 
in economic sustainability, more often it is the case that mothers 
92. While W-2 agencies are limited to two three-year contracts at a time, they 
have the first right of refusal for renewal of the terms of the contract. See Wisconsin 
Works (W-2) and Related Programs Contract 2006-2009, WIS. DEP’T CHILD. & FAMS., 
http://dcf.wisconsin.gov/w2/contracts/20062009/default.htm (last updated Dec. 23, 2010). 
93. ANDREA  ROBLES, FRED  DOOLITTLE, & SUSAN  GOODEN, COMMUNITY  SER­
VICE JOBS IN WISCONSIN WORKS: THE MILWAUKEE COUNTY EXPERIENCE ES-1 (2003), 
available at http://www.mdrc.org/publications/344/execsum.pdf. 
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move into the workforce arena only to make salaries which are 
equal to their previous welfare payments or in some cases signifi­
cantly less, without the same health or childcare benefits.94  In this 
particular study, many of the mothers expressed frustration with the 
lateral and many times downward move from public benefits to pri­
vate wages.  By way of example, Cynthia, who transitioned from 
AFDC to W-2 in 1997 and remained on W-2 until her time limit 
expired, has this to say: 
I don’t mind working, but if I’m gonna work I want to make 
more money than AFDC or W-2 would give me or else what’s 
the point.  Why should I go out and bust my back for less than $6 
dollars an hour at some place like Burger King and they only give 
me 20 hours a week and I have to feed my children. That don’t 
make no sense.  It’s not like I don’t want to work . . . [you might 
think that I’m just] lazy and I just don’t want to work, but that is 
not the case, I don’t want to be no slave for nobody—I don’t 
have no lot of kids, I don’t just go get pregnant for no check, but 
I do have kids and they are here and it ain’t their fault.  I am not 
trying to get rich off welfare, but damn, I ain’t trying to stay poor 
either.  W-2 sending me out to work and it seem like I ain’t mak­
ing hardly no money at all.  This job don’t want me and they 
damn sho’ don’t want to pay me nothing.  All us mothers out 
here who strugglin’ on welfare and W-2 and now that we have to 
work, we still struggling, cause it’s not enough money and in my 
case it’s less.  I need help, not a hand out but a real job, where I 
can feel proud of myself to go to work, where I can get things my 
kids need and things that they want sometimes too.  I need a real 
job to make real money so I don’t have to live here in this neigh­
borhood, but between that little old job I have and W-2 this is all 
I can afford.  W-2 ain’t really helped me cause I am still po’ 
[laughing at this last statement] and as long as I’m on W-2 I think 
I’m gone stay poor.95 
Here, Cynthia expresses the sentiment of many mothers who 
participated in the study.  She powerfully encapsulates what can be 
called the paradox of self-reliance so romantically tied to the world 
of wage labor.  On the one hand, the W-2 system dictates that wo­
men must get off the rolls and work, and in fact women want to do 
just that.  But on the other hand, there are competing understand­
ings of what self-reliance means. Welfare officials relegate these 
94. See generally JOEL. F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL  HASENFELD, WE THE  POOR 
PEOPLE: WORK, POVERTY, AND WELFARE (1997). 
95. Interview by author with Cynthia, a W-2 recipient (2005). 
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women to the arguably most visible sign of self-reliance: working 
for wages.  But the women understand that self-reliance must be 
connected to sustainability.  In the end, legions of women working 
with wages but without self-sufficiency provide a poignant evalua­
tion of the transition from welfare to workfare.96 
IV. PROFITS INDUCE PRESSURE TO PERFORM 
FEP workers are also exposed to a set of undue pressures.  If 
their professional goal is to clear cases (which in the privatized era 
no longer means to solve mothers’ problems), then they are evalu­
ated in their job performance based on how many mothers they get 
off the welfare rolls.  A FEP worker confirms: 
So as you can see there is a lot of pressure to clear those cases, at 
least if I want to keep my job and keep getting those bonuses 
[laughing].  I like the bonuses, but no seriously.  I try to help peo­
ple, but if there is any indication that this person should be at 
least trying on their own, I think that they are job ready, that 
there is really nothing we can do for them.  As a person I feel bad 
because I can understand sometimes where they are coming 
from, but at the same time, I have a job to do. You can see how 
this could be stressful, I have one devil at one end telling me I 
have to, well not directly, but making me feel like I have to get 
my case load down and I know I have to get it down.  And I have 
a devil at the other end, begging me to give them an extension or 
not to sanction them or whatever.  Sometimes I go home at night 
and I don’t want to hear a word from anyone.97 
While this study does not suggest that there were conspirato­
rial practices afoot in any W-2 agency, one can intuit that FEP 
workers were at least encouraged to remove women from the finan­
cial support categories on the W-2 ladder and into the job ready 
status.  This pressure was revealed in the possibility of bonuses that 
could be reaped at the end of the fiscal year or at least the security 
of employment for quality FEP job performance. Therefore, it 
would seem that keeping women suppressed generates profits.  Un­
surprisingly, not only did the FEP workers in this study reveal the 
complexity of the pressures associated with finding appropriate 
placement for the W-2 participants, but also the W-2 mothers re­
flected on their frustrations with these over-worked FEP workers: 
96. See generally JENNIFER MITTELSTADT, FROM WELFARE TO WORKFARE: THE 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF LIBERAL REFORM, 1945-1965 (2005). 
97. Interview by author with FEP worker (2005). 
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Every time I go and see my FEP, she is in a bad mood well she is 
in one to me and she always asking me if I found a job yet—there 
ain’t no jobs and the more she keep asking me ain’t gonna make 
me have a job.  I believe that that’s all they want to do is to put us 
in these jobs cleaning toilets and stuff and that’s it so they can 
keep that money.  There was this big scandal with this one agency 
so I know they get to keep that money.  Every time, I am telling 
you she asks me if I been looking for a job as if that’s all I have to 
do I mean I do look for a job, but no one trying to hire me except 
if I want to clean they toilet or work in a nursing home wiping 
someone’s ass and my baby out of diapers so why do I want to do 
that for.  You see they have lots of cases too, so they just want to 
get rid of some of us, but until I find a job that’s good for me and 
good for my you know my life you know what I am trying to say 
then I am going to stay on W-2 until I can really find something 
and I wish she quit asking me if I have a job cuz I don’t.98 
This statement reveals that W-2 participants were not immune 
from the profit margin pressures associated with decreasing the 
numbers of enrollees in W-2.  In fact, W-2 clients become unwitting 
participants in their own demise.  The very fact that W-2 partici­
pants have a difficult time navigating or receiving help within the 
W-2 industry is the condition upon which W-2 as an industry mea­
sures success.  FEP workers are encouraged to reduce their 
caseloads.  It goes without saying that higher caseloads could pro­
duce inefficient work product.  Therefore, it would make sense to 
attempt to move W-2 participants into self-sufficient positions or at 
least make it difficult for mothers to gain access to resources that 
may discourage a more efficient path to job readiness or resources 
that more effectively diminish the profit margin of a contracted 
agency.  However, there are consequences when welfare becomes a 
private institution whose profit is generated by moving women off 
the rolls.  Not only is the quality of life of W-2 mothers removed 
from the rolls at stake, but also the quality of services provided to 
the remaining W-2 mothers by stressed FEP workers. The mediat­
ing function between FEP workers and W-2 clients continues to be 
a supply and demand relationship that rests on the issue of need. 
However, amidst a privatization of the welfare system, the very 
terms on which need is defined have shifted from the everyday sur­
vival and upward mobility of clients, to the job security of FEP 
workers and the downsizing of social possibility for everyone in­
volved.  In the end, FEP workers, alongside—most centrally—cli­
98. Interview by author with Special, a W-2 recipient mother (2005). 
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ents, must take the complicated, messy, and uneven realities of 
their everyday lives and convert them into commodities that can be 
deemed profitable for what has become a welfare industry. 
V. COMMODIFICATION OF NEED 
In a free market capitalist system, all social relations take on a 
commodity value.99  When welfare services become privatized, that 
free market gives them meaning.  However, because the govern­
ment to a certain extent is still involved in regulation, in reality, 
welfare services are placed in what is called a mixed market—one 
where there is a mixture of private and governmental control of the 
product or service that has been commodified.100  In any case, com­
modification of services transforms welfare benefits into what the 
participants refer to as “labor for sale to the highest bidder.”  Ac­
cording to Naomi: 
This system is all messed up. You have people out here hustling 
trying to make ends meet and W-2 don’t care.  In the beginning 
when everyone knew what the hell they were doing, I guess there 
were or it seem like there were more opportunities, but now no 
one knows what the hell is going on too many ex-W-2 workers as 
FEP workers and it seems to me that labor is for sale to the high­
est bidder no matter what your skill level is.  I have been in this 
CSJ for damn near the end of my time and it is not an advantage 
for them to put me in a regular job because then they don’t get 
99. The basic premise emerges from Karl Marx’s general theory of commodity 
fetishism, which argues that in capitalist societies social relationships are transformed 
into seemingly objective relationships between commodities or other forms of market 
exchange (i.e., currency).  However, later scholars have also explored the subjective 
nature of class as a mode for explaining capitalist social relations, generally arguing that 
the intersectional influence of gender, race, and sexual standpoints do not simply in­
form, but equally give meaning to, the commodity form within capitalist social relations. 
See Arjun Appadarai, Commodities and the Politics of Value, in INTERPRETING  OB­
JECTS AND COLLECTIONS, 76, 76 (Susan Pearce, ed., 1994). See generally ANGELA DA­
VIS, WOMEN, RACE, AND  CLASS (1983); RODERICK A. FERGUSON, ABERRATIONS IN 
BACK: TOWARD A QUEER OF COLOR CRITIQUE (2004); CEDRIC J. ROBINSON, BLACK 
MARXISM: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK RADICAL TRADITION (1983); JOAN WALLACH 
SCOTT, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF HISTORY, (Rev. ed., Columbia University Press 
1999). 
100. A mixed market economy is defined as “[a]n economy in which a substantial 
number, though by no means all, of the activities of production, distribution and ex­
change are undertaken by the government, and there is more interference by the State 
than there would be in a market economy.  A mixed economy thus combines the char­
acteristics of both Capitalism and Socialism.” See THE NORTON DICTIONARY OF MOD­
ERN THOUGHT 534 (Allen Bullock & Stephen Trombley, eds., 3d sub. ed. 1999). 
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paid as long as I am here because they can’t say I am job ready so 
as long as I am here they get paid.101 
As this participant reveals, the very needs of W-2 recipients are also 
a commodity and subject to be sold in the mixed market like any 
other product or service.  This translates into FEP workers estab­
lishing certain need matrices—where they do not look at the indi­
vidual recipient, but they convert the individual person’s experience 
into distinct and discreet parts to fit in the matrix. 
If the actual needs of the recipient do not meet the matrix then 
the recipient has to mold her need to make herself more com­
modifiable or translatable within the W-2 market system. The real­
ity of this mixed market system is that the market exists to benefit 
the private agencies and not the welfare recipients themselves. This 
approach is revealed through a number of avenues, such as the mo­
nopoly of services by single agencies and the establishment of the 
low-skilled working poor brand.  When the recipient has reached 
their twenty-four month time limit, they are booted out of the pro­
gram.102  If they have secured employment, then the W-2 program 
has done its job and the private industry wins.  However, if they 
have not secured employment, the private industry still wins be­
cause they reap the contractual windfall of removing yet another 
person from the program. 
I am going to tell you the truth, it is hard out there. I have tried 
to find a job and I look on the computer and in the newspaper. 
But no one does not want to hire me.  I am not saying it’s racist 
or discrimination, there are just no jobs out there for us, it is too 
many of us and not enough jobs.  But what I don’t understand 
though is how are all these Maximus and Y works and OIC still 
in business if they can’t find no job for me.103 
This woman is demonstrating the ill-effects of what can be un­
derstood as the development of a reserve labor force, where we see 
a glut in a specific worker population that overwhelms the number 
of relevant jobs available in the labor market.  However, many 
scholars conclude that such a ratio is at best an anomaly within the 
nature of economic markets.104  Is this the case here when we have 
101. Interview by author with Naomi, a W-2 recipient (2005). 
102. W-2 Manual, supra note 43, at ch. 2.10.3. 
103. Interview by author with Jones, a W-2 recipient (2005). 
104. For an insightful discussion on this topic see generally GRACE  HONG, THE 
RUPTURES OF AMERICAN CAPITAL: WOMEN OF COLOR FEMINISM AND THE CULTURE 
OF  IMMIGRANT  LABOR (2006); ALTAGRACIA  ORTIZ, PUERTO  RICAN  WOMEN AND 
WORK: BRIDGES IN  TRANSATIONAL  LABOR (1996); ANDREW  ROSS, NICE  WORK IF 
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public/private partnerships creating companies to produce this re­
serve labor force?  Are we in fact compelled to entertain the possi­
bility that these current economic relationships are not an anomaly, 
but at some level intentional?  Whatever the case may be, the cur­
rent W-2 program is producing a laborer without a labor market. 
To be sure, if welfare were still held under the authority of the pub­
lic, a reserve labor force would still be produced.  But what is signif­
icant about the emergence of W-2 is that it produces not simply a 
reserve labor force, but a whole new industry where public re­
sources are being transferred into private hands. The focus here 
should not only be on the laborer but it should draw attention to 
the state’s production of a new capitalist: the workfare agency and 
their relationship to the shadow market. 
In the end, the commodification of need is simply the final 
stage, a consequence of the larger privatization of welfare as a so­
cial institution.  In the current shift from welfare as a social agency 
to welfare as a private industry, the idea of efficiency replaces 
equality, profit replaces need, and consumer branding has all but 
overwhelmed the meaning of citizen rights.  It is not that the par­
ticipants in this study do not want to work or even that the FEP 
workers do not want to help, it is that such interests are fact anti­
thetical to the now established market logic of simply and com­
pletely getting women off the rolls and the profits generated by that 
ethos. 
On paper the push to privatization seems productive, cost-ef­
fective, and even potentially lucrative. The idea that marketplace 
competition models can stem the tide of a bloated, costly, and inef­
fective governmental bureaucracy makes sense (and perhaps even 
dollars).  However, the women in need are lost in the financial 
spreadsheets.  Their stories in fact reveal the both intended and un­
intended pitfalls of a for-profit approach.  In the end, we must ask 
ourselves, when it comes to our citizens in need, do we want to 
associate the “best” solutions with the “cheapest” service? 
YOU CAN GET IT: LIFE AND LABOR IN PRECARIOUS TIMES (2009); JENNIFER G. SCHIR­
MER, THE LIMITS OF REFORM: WOMEN, CAPITAL, AND REFORM (1982); Fred Magdoff 
and Harry Magdoff, Disposable Workers: Today’s Reserve Army of Labor, MONTHLY 
REV. Vol. 55, No.11 (April 2004), available at www.monthlyreview.org/0404magdoff. 
htm; Elaine McCrate, ‘Hitting Bottom’: Welfare ‘Reform’ and Labor Markets, DOLLARS 
& SENSE (Sept./Oct. 1997); Alan Finder, Evidence is Scant that Workfare Leads to Full-
Time Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1998, available at http://www.duke.edu/~ldbaker/clip­
pings/ny-workfare.html. 
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CONCLUSION 
With our inheritance of this cost/benefit legacy in mind we 
need to begin thinking about how to recreate the framework for 
providing public services.  The community service component of W­
2 and its actual function powerfully demonstrates how W-2 mothers 
have become a reserve labor force.  But at the same time the con­
tours of W-2 make reserve labor status profitable, not for the 
mothers, but for the sub-contracted agencies. The relationship be­
tween W-2 mothers, the status of community service, and the posi­
tion of sub-contracted agencies have generated a shadow market as 
a consequence of welfare privatization.  The ways in which these 
women are held captive to a world without work, a world without 
skill building, and limited ways out become the grounds upon which 
sub-contracting agencies generate profit.  Under the shroud of “cost 
effectiveness,” private agencies are reaping the financial windfall of 
“pimping” the state based on their ability to market their skills at 
converting welfare mothers into low-wage workers.105  What will be 
the ultimate cost? 
105. In 2001 five agencies controlled the W-2 zones in Milwaukee County.  Em­
ployment Solutions was paid over 93 million dollars, OIC was paid over 50 million 
dollars, UMOS was paid over 39 million dollars, YW-Works was paid over 38 million 
dollars and Maximus was paid over 48 million dollars to provide service to W-2 clients. 
See DEP’T OF  WORKFORCE  DEV., AN  EVALUATION:  WISCONSIN  WORK’S (W-2) PRO­
GRAM, (Apr. 2001), available at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lab/reports/01-7full.pdf. 
According to Wisconsin Fiscal Audit Bureaus Report in 2001, spending on welfare in­
creased by over 150 million dollars from 1986 to 2001.  Profits received by W-2 agencies 
totaled over 65 million dollars. Id.. 
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